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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
P. K. EDMUNDS, ELLA M. EDMUNDS,
CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, a minor,
FRANKLIN EDMUNDS, a minor,
JOHN EDMUNDS, a minor, and ANN
EDMUNDS, a minor, by their guardian ad litem ELLA M. EDMUNDS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
9349

vs.

KENNETH GERMER, JED R. ABBOTT,
and DAVID R. WALDRON, partners,
doing business under the firm name of
GERMER, ABBOTT & WALDRON,
Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As in the brief of defendants and appellants, the same
designations of the parties will be used herein as were used
in the trial court.
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Defendants have appealed from s1x judgments which
total $16,000 (R. 94-99) entered by the District Court of Iron
County, March 9, 1960, in accordance with jury verdicts (R.
88-93), in favor of the six plaintiffs, as follows:
Dr. P. K. Edmunds --------------------------$11,500
Mrs. Ella M. Edmunds, wife ________ 2,500
500
Charlotte Edmunds, daughter ________
Franklin Edmunds, son ____________________
500
John Edmunds, son -------------------------Ann Edmunds, daughter __________________

500
500

Defendants made timely motions for directed verdicts
at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence (Tr. 205-8), and at
the conclusion of their own case (Tr. 313). Defendants also
made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts
(R. 104), and a motion for a new trial (R. 102-3). The
motions were taken under advisement (Tr. 208, 313), were
subsequently argued on June 8, 1960 (R. 106), and denied
in a memorandum decision on August 22, 1960 (R. 107).
The verdicts and judgments were for personal injuries
and property damage sustained by plaintiffs when an automobile
driven by Dr. Edmunds, in which his wife, children and a
guest were passengers, plunged into an unguarded and unmarked cut in the road (Ex. 5, Tr. 99-101, 164, 176). The
accident occured between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock p.m., November 27, 1955, while Dr. Edmunds, his family and their
guest were on a Sunday afternoon excursion to inspect farm
lands owned by Dr. Edmunds on both sides of the highway
north of Paragonah, Utah (Tr. 95, 186, 216). At the time of

2
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the accident work on the highway construction project was temporarily suspended for seasonal reasons (Tr. 202-203, Ex. 15).
The following facts are undisputed:
Under a contract between defendants and the State Road
Commission, executed May 10, 1955, defendants were engaged in constructing approximately 15.511 miles of new
highway (Ex. 12). The contract also called for the "obliteration" of 6.625 miles of the old road, including that portion
of the old road over which Dr. Edmunds was driving at the
time of the accident (Tr. 202) and for "cuts" in the old road
to provide drainage (Tr. 221). Part of the contract was a
set of "Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Con·
struction (Ex. 12), which in part provided:

flf

i~

1-4.5 (p. 21): ~~Maintenance of Traffic. Adequate
signs, flagmen, red lights and barricades shall at all
time be provided by the Contractor at his own expense
where traffic is diverted from the existing road or
where rough road or a dangerous condition exists due
to construction operations. * * *
"When construction operations are suspended by
written order of the Engineer for seasonal conditions
or other conditions for which the Contractor is not
responsible, maintenance of the road under traffic,
including signs, barricades, etc., shall be performed
by and at the expense of the Commission during the
period of such suspension. * * * Necessary signs and
barricades as provided by the contractor shall be left
in place during the time of suspension." (Emphasis
added).
1-7.7 (p. 38): 11 Public Convenience and Safety. The
Contractor shall at all times so conduct his work as to
insure the least possible obstruction to traffic. The

3
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convenience of the general · public and the residents
along the highway and the protection of persons and
property are of prime importance and shall be provided for by the Contractor in an adequate and satisfactory manner.
"The Contractor shall maintain a safe and proper
connection with all intersecting public or private roads
or driveways, and conduct the work so as to cause no
unnecessary inconvenience to residents along the road.
No road shall be closed to the public except by express
permission of the engineer. * * *"
1-7.9 (p. 39): rrBarricades and Warning Signs. The
Contractor shall provide, erect, and maintain all necessary barricades, suitable and sufficient red lights, danger
signals, and other signs, provide a sufficient number
of watchmen and take all necessary precautions for
the protection of the work and the safety of the public.
Highways closed to traffic shall be protected by effective
barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated at
night. Suitable warning signs, illuminated at night by
lanterns, flares, or other approved means, shall be
provided to mark the places where surfacing ends or
is not compacted or other obstructions. * * * "
1-7.15 (p. 43): rropening Sections of Project to
Traffic. At the option of the Engineer, certain sections
of the work may be inspected, and completed work
tentatively accepted for the use of traffic. Such acceptance shall not constitute final acceptance of the work
or any part of it or a waiver of any provisions of the
contract; * * * "
1-8.9 (p. 51): rrTermination of Contractor} s Responsibility. The contract will be considered complete
when all work has been finished, the final inspection
made by the Engineer, and the project accepted in
writing by the Commission. The Contractor's responsibility shall then cease, except as set forth in his bond."

4
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2-11.1 (p. 79): uobliteration of Old Roads. Description. * * * The obliteration of old roads shall
consist of appropriate grading of portions of the old
road that are to be abandoned, and shall include the
removal or covering of pavements, scarifying, plowing,
and harrowing all of the areas of the old roadway as
directed.
2-11.2 (p. 79: uconstruction Methods. After the old
road is no longer needed for traffic, the existing oil
or gravel surfacing shall be bladed into ditches, borrow
pits, or alongside the embankment and covered with
earth; * * * After the above work is completed, the
area of the old road surfacing shall be scarified or
plowed to mix effectively the remaining material with
the earth. * * * "
The "cut" in the old road into which the Edmunds' car
plunged was within the project covered by the contract and
was made by defendants pursuant to the contract to provide
for drainage of the area between the old and the new highways (Tr. 198). There is no dispute that the "cut" in question
was made by defendants prior to the time-November 19,
1955 - when further work was suspended for seasonal
reasons.
Defendants acknowledge that the contract required them
to "substantially obliterate the old road" (Tr. 199, 308) and
it is undisputed that the scarifying, or tearing up, of the old
road did not take place until work was resumed in June,
1956 (Tr. 202, 247, 254). It is submitted that there is no
dispute as to the condition of the old road at the time of the
accident. Patrolman Reed testified that it was "travelled,
polished" oil, and that it was in better condition than shown
in the pictures which were taken 6 weeks later and which are

5
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Exhibits 2 to 5, inclusive (Tr. 26, 32-33). Mr. Silas Morrell,
defendants' superintendent of construction on this project, in
response to a question as to whether the old road was in good
condition on the day of the accident, answered, "Yes, it was
passable, sure" (Tr. 290). Mrs. Edmunds testified that the
"old road was a good highway. It was clear, no debris" (Tr.
187).
We believe it is undisputed that on the day of the accident
-November 27, 1955-Dr. Edmunds, his wife and children
and a guest, decided to go for a drive to inspect farm property
owned by Dr. Edmunds lying along the east and west sides
of the old and new highways near the south end of the construction project. They drove north from Cedar City to the
south end of the project where the old and new highways
joined. Dr. Edmunds drove north along the new highway to
a point near the north end of his property. After briefly
inspecting his property at that point they then crossed over
to the old highway by an access road to look over his property
along the west side of the old road right of way. After inspecting the property, and possibly after stopping to look at
some flowing wells from a distance, Dr. Edmunds drove the car
south along the old road. As he approached the south end of
the project, where the old and new roads joined, he suddenly
saw the "cut" in the road and before he could stop, the automobile plunged into the excavation. (See testimony of Dr.
Edmunds T r. 94-99) .
Another undisputed fact is that there were no warning
signs, barricades, or markers of any kind at or near the cut
in the old road into which the Edmunds' automobile plunged

6
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or at any
to the old
It is also
barricade
Memorial
19).

of the approach roads leading from the new road
road (Tr. 89, 218-19; defendants' brief, page 13).
undisputed that there was no warning sign or
between the south end of the project and Lunt
Park, a distance of about 5 miles (Tr. 289, 265, Ex.

The principal questions about which there is some conflict
m the testimony are:
1. Whether there was a barricade across the old
road where it and the new highway joined at the south
end of the project on the day of the accident.
2. Whether the cuts in the old road between the
north point of Dr. Edmunds' property and the scene
of the accident were made prior to or subsequent to the
day of the accident.

3. Whether a cut in the old road south of the scene
of the accident and north of a road connecting the new
and old roads was made prior to or subsequent to the
accident.
As to whether there was a signed barricade across the
old road at its junction with the new highway on the south
end the testimony may be summarized as follows: Sgt. Reed
testified there was a "sawhorse effect sign saying 'Detour' or
'Road Closed,' he was not certain which, that did not completely block off the highway,'' and that there were "tracks
evident on both sides that you could go around it'' (Tr. 39);
Dr. Edmunds testified that he saw no warning signs or barricades indicating that the old highway was not open to traffic
( Tr. 113-14, 151) ; Mr. Hiatt, who drove the wrecker which
removed the Edmunds' car after the accident, testified he

7
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did not recall seeing any warning signs and that there ''were
no barricades near where the car plunged in," that when he
got Dr. Edmunds' car up on the roadway he "proceeded out
the old road to somewhere where they came together, or near
that point, gained access to the new road and on to Cedar,"
and that he did "recall going out the old highway" (Tr. 89-91);
defendants' witness Claude Kemp Savage, who was driving
south on the new road at the time of the accident, testified
that he saw a barricade at the north end of the project on the
day of the accident (some 12-15 miles north of the scene
of the accident) but that he did not recall seeing any barricades, equipment or fences across the old road at the south
end (Tr. 210-11, 218-19); defendants' witness Ben Lee, resident engineer, testified that there were barricades at both the
north and south ends of the project (Tr. 231) but that "on
the north we went in for more elaborate signing, because we,
again, detoured from the new road over to the old road"
(Tr. 232) and that some complaint about the signing at the
north end was "another reason for the elaborate signing, was
on the north end there. We didn't have it adequately signed"
(Tr. 243); that at the south end "There was a barricade there
at the time we turned the contractor loose. I mean, we shut
him down for the winter" (Tr. 224), and that for two hundred
feet they took out the old highway completely in order to get
material to use on the new highway (Tr. 224-25); Mr. Silas
Morrell, defendants· superintendent of construction, testified
that they had placed 16-foot standard barricaded signs at the
south end (Tr. 264-65) but that the signs could have been
destroyed between the time work was suspended (November
19, 1955) and the date of the accident (November 27, 1955)
(Tr. 286).

8
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I:

I~

With reference to the importance of the question whether
cuts in the old road to the north of the scene of the accident
were made prior to or subsequent to the accident defendants
seem to take contradictory positions. At page 3 of their Statement of Facts they state that they "regard his question as of
small consequence in view of the uncontradicted fact that
Edmunds drove on this old road for some distance before
driving into one of these cuts." Despite this statement belittling the importance of the question, defendants repeatedly
refer to the cuts throughout their Statement of Facts and the
Argument as though it was clearly established the cuts had
been made on the day of the accident. On page 2 of their
brief they state that the "old section of highway had been cut
in 20 places * * * and was fenced off at various points throughout its length at six places, so that it was no longer useable
for travel," implying that such was the condition of the road
at the time of the accident. On page 5 of their brief, they
refer to the warning of the "cuts in the old road" and make
the bald statement (which the record does not support) that
by the time work was suspended "all of the work on the project
covered by the contract had been completed, with the exception
of the scarification of the surface of the old road." On page
8 they state that "all of the cuts were readily discernible to
anyone travelling on the new road," again implying that they
had all been made by the day of the accident and ignoring the
irrelevancy of cuts made many miles from the scene of the
accident. On pages 9, 14, 15, 17, 22, 32 and 33 of their brief
defendants lean heavily upon the contention that the old
road had been cut in 20 places.
In addition to the irrelevancy of cuts, fences, barricades

9
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and signs at the north end of the project, or at any point north
of the area travelled by Dr. Edmunds on the day of the accident,
we call particular attention to Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5, which,
we believe, completely demolish the contentions, upon which
defendants rely so heavily, that all 20 of the cuts including
the three to six cuts in that part of the old road traveled by
Dr. Edmunds (Tr. 289, 297, 300, 222, 229, 234-35 256-57)
were made prior to suspension of work and prior to the time
of the accident. Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5, taken 6 weeks after
the accident at points between the north end of Dr. Edmunds'
property and the cut into which his car plunged show clearly
that in January, 1956, there were no other cuts in the road
and that there were no barricades or warning signs. Besides
these exhibits, the testimony of Dr. Edmunds and that of his
wife (Tr. 113, 176, 179, 184-88) that they travelled the old
road for about one and three-eighths miles before encountering
the cut into which their car plunged, is uncontradicted. Moreover, defendants' witness Claude Kemp Savage testified that he
saw the Edmunds' ~ar traveling on the old road for from 1V2 to
2 blocks before it plunged into the open cut (Tr. 214). We
submit that Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5, and the supporting testimony
of Dr. and Mrs. Edmunds and of Mr. Savage clearly establish
that the old road for a distance of at least one and three-eighths
miles north of the scene of the accident had not been cut on
November 27, 1955, and that Mr. Morrell and Mr. Lee were in
error when they testified that that stretch of the old road had
been cut prior to the accident.
That Mr. Lee and Mr. Morrell were in error when they
testified that no cuts in the old road were made after the
accident is also established by the testimony of Mr. Homer

10
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J

1
1

Jones, the photographer, and by Exhibit 5. The latter is a
photograph of the cut into which the Edmunds' automobile
plunged and it shows Mr. Jones' car on the old road near the
south edge of the cut. Mr. Jones testified that the car was
driven there by way of a road connecting the old and new
roads south of the accident scene (Tr. 84-86). At the time
of the trial, however, there was a cut in the old road between
the one where the accident occured and the connecting road
to the south. It is obvious, of course, that Mr. Jones' car could
not possibly have been driven over the connecting road and
then north up the old road to the south edge of the cut shown
in Exhibit 5 if the other cut had been made in the old road
prior to the accident.
We submit that the evidence clearly establishes that at
least one cut south of the scene of the accident and from three
to six cuts to the north were all made after resumption of
work on the project in June, 1956.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IN
NOT WARNING PLAINTIFFS OF THE DANGEROUS
CONDITION ON THE ROAD CAUSING PLAINTIFFS'
INJURIES.
POINT II.
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. PLAIN-

11
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TIFF P. K. EDMUNDS WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT III.
THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED BELOW WERE NOT
EXCESSIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IN
NOT WARNING PLAINTIFFS OF THE DANGEROUS
CONDITION ON THE ROAD CAUSING PLAINTIFFS'
INJURIES.
Although defendants contend they had no duty with
respect to Dr. and Mrs. Edmunds and their children to do
anything more than they did, the jury and the trial court concluded otherwise. Even granting, which we do only for the
sake of argument, that there was some sort of sign at the sou~
end of the constructon project (which is one of the disputed
issues of the case), there is no dispute whatsoever (see first
full sentence on page 13 of defendants' brief) that there was
no sign, barricade or warning of any kind at the cut in the
road into which the Edmunds car plunged or on any of the
access roads. The only thing that even the defendants contend
was done (which we do not concede was done) to warn
persons approaching from the south was the erection of some

12
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kind of sign at the junction of the new and old highways.
At the cut in the old road there was no warning of any kind.
There was no warning on any of the access roads either where
they took off from the new highway or where they crossed
the old highway.
Much was said at the trial, and much is said in defendants'
brief about the "more elaborate" signs at the north end of
the project (Tr. 232) some 12 miles north of the scene of
the accident. There had been some complaints as to the adequacy of the signs at the north end. Resident Engineer Lee
testified: "That was another reason for the elaborate signing,
was on the north end there. We didn't have it adequately
signed" (Tr. 243). But Dr. Edmunds and his family didn't
get within 10 miles of the "more elaborate" signs at the north
end of the project. Like defendants' argument that they had
done everything necessary to complete the new highway, their
arguments about the character and sufficiency of the signs
at the north end are meaningless. The accident happened on
the old road, not on the new road, near the south end of the
project, not near the north end. Dr. Edmunds and his family
approached the area from the south and didn't travel more
than about 11;2 miles on the new highway before they turned
west and, using one of the access roads, crossed over to the
west side of the right-of-way to inspect lands owned by Dr.
Edmunds.
As previously indicated, plaintiffs dispute the claim of
defendants that a sign was placed across part of the old road
at the junction of it and the new highway. Dr. Edmunds did
not recall seeing such a sign ( T r. 113-114, 151) . Defendants'
witness Claude Kemp Savage testified he saw a barricade at

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the north end of the project but that he did not recall seeing
any barricades, equipment or fences across the old road at
the south end (Tr. 210, 218-19). The driver of the wrecker
which was used to remove Dr. Edmunds' car from the cut
testified he did not recall seeing any warning signs and that
there "were no barricades near where the car plunged in"
and that when he got Dr. Edmunds' car out of the cut he
"proceeded out the old road to somewhere where they came
together, or near that point, gained access to the new road
and on to Cedar" ( T r. 89-90) . While Sgt. Reed, of the Highway Patrol, testified that there was a "sawhorse effect sign"
at the south end of the old road, he also testified that it did
not completley block off the highway and that "there was
tracks evident on both sides that you could go around it"
(Tr. 39).
In Brower v. Moran Paving Co., 58 Utah 349, 199 Pac.
144, a passenger brought suit against a highway contractor
and recovered for in juries received when the automobile ran
into a trench in the street, only part of which was barricaded.
The court stated:
"Barriers erected to prevent danger to travelers or
warn the public of the dangerous condition of a street
must be at least reasonably sufficient for that purpose.
In the present case it was a question for the jury's
decision as to whether the trestle was sufficient in
length, and as to whether it was negligence to have
from 18 to 30 feet of the trench without a barrier or
guard of any kind.
·'Whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is not free from substantial doubt. The question
of contributory negligence was for the jury and not

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

'

for the court to decide, because different minds might
reasonably arrive at different conclusions as to whether
plaintiff was culpably negligent.
"We think the issues were properly submitted to the
jury, and that the court committed no abuse of discretion in overruling appellant's motion for a new
trial. The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs."
Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 Pac. 676, was an
appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, who was
the driver and owner of an automobile and was brought
against a state road contractor who left unguarded, unlighted
and unbarricaded an excavation in a state highway into which
the plaintiff drove his automobile. As in the instant case, the
contractor had "agreed and covenanted with the state road
commission of the State of Utah to erect and maintain good
and sufficient guards, baricades, and signals * * * to protect
the public from any dangerous condition arising out of or incidental to said improvement of said street." The court affirmed
the lower court's judgment on the jury verdict, and said:

"It is not necessary to review the evidence. It is
sufficient to say that plaintiff's evidence fully justified
the court in submitting each cause of action to the
jury, and that the evidence on the principal issues was
conflicting.

* * *
"Except those of New Jersey, the courts have held
that such contracts inure to the benefit of any one
of the public who is injured by the negligent failure
of the contractor to take those precautions which he
agreed to take for the protection of the public. The
contract is a measure of the contractor's duty. If he
assumes a responsibility broader than that of his com-
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mon law liability for negligence, he becomes liable for
torts arising out of a breach of such duty which are
the proximate cause of injury to third persons.

* *

*

"In light of the above authorities, and upon principle,
we conclude that a case was stated and proved against
appellant, based upon his common-law liability for
negligence, and also upon the tort arising from the
breach of the contract, in which he assumed duties
and obligations that he has no right to repudiate when
his negligent failure to comply with and observe them
has resulted in injury and damage to the property of
respondent and that of his assignors." (Emphasis
supplied).
We submit that defendants failed to perform both their
common law duty to plaintiffs and the duty they assumed under
provisions of the contract pursuant to which the road project
was being constructed. Under common law principles defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs to warn them of the dangerous
condition defendants had created on the old road. This they
neglected to do. They neglected to place any warning sign or
barricade on the old road near the cut or on any of the access
roads where they crossed or intersected the old road. Plaintiffs
were fully within their rights in traveling north along the
new highway to the north end of Dr. Edmunds' property and
in using the access road to drive west from the new highway
to the old road to view his property to the west of the rightof-way. It was the natural and normal thing for Dr. Edmunds
to do to turn south from the access road and travel along the
so-called old road-a polished, travelled oiled highway in
good condition (Tr. 26, 32-33, 290). One sign or barricade
at the cut or at the intersection of the old road and the nearest
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access road would have warned plaintiffs of the dangerous
condition. But defendants neglected to put up such a sign
or barricade, and left an open, unguarded cut in the road.
As part of their contract with the State of Utah, defendants agreed (Ex. 12) in part, as follows:
~~Maintenance of Traffic. Adequate signs, flagmen,
red lights and barricades shall at all time be provided
by the Contractor at his own expense where traffic is
diverted from the existing road or where rough road
or a dangerous condition exists due to construction
operations. * * * (Ex. 12, p. 21, 1-4.5).

rrBarricades and Warning Signs. The Contractor
shall provide, erect, and maintain all necessary barricades, suitable and sufficient red lights, danger signals,
and other signs, provide a sufficient number of watchmen and take all necessary precautions for the protection of the work and the safety of the public. Highways closed to traffic shall be protected by effective
barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated at
night. Suitable warning signs, illuminated at night by
lanterns, flares, or other approved means, shall be
provided to mark the places where surfacing ends or is
not compacted or other obstructions. * * * " (Ex. 12,
p. 39, 1-7.9).

Part of the "measure of the contractor's duty" * * * that
"inure ( s) to the benefit of any one of the public who is
injured" (see Metcalf v. Mellen, supra), was for defendants
to provide rr adequate signs * * * where * * * a dangerous
condition exists due to construction operations" and rr effective
barricades" where "(H) ighways (are) closed to traffic," as
well as to "take all necessary precautions * * * for the safety
of the public," including but not limited to "suitable warning

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

signs * * * to mark the places where surfacing ends." These
duties were not properly discharged in this case by defendants.
Throughout their brief defendants make repeated references to 20 cuts in the old road along the length of the project;
to fences in six places; and, continually assert that the old
highway had been abandoned. We submit that the cuts in
the old highway north of the scene of the accident as far as
the north end of Dr. Edmunds' property, clearly were made
after the accident. We also submit that the record just as
plainly establishes that one cut south of the accident location
was made subsequent to November 27, 1955. The fences, like
the "more elaborate signing" at the north end of the project,
relate to areas far removed from the scene of the accident.
In asserting that the old road had been abandoned, defendants
overlook two express provisions in their contract. In Section
1-7.7 of the Standard Specifications (Ex. 12) it is provided
that "No road shall be closed to the public except by express
permission of the engineer." The record does not disclose
that permissoin was given to close and abandon the old road
prior to the day of the accident. Section 1-8.9 (Ex. 12) provides
that the "contract will be considered complete when all work
has been finished, the final inspection made by the Engineer,
and the project accepted in writing by the Commission" and
that the "Contractor's responsibility shall then cease" (emphasis
added). This project was not accepted, and the contractor's
liability did not cease, until after the work was completed in
the spring of 1956.
Even if the old road had been abandoned on the
date of the accident, which plaintiffs deny, the Michigan court
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m Jewell v. Rogers Township, 175 N.W. 151, held that
where a road had been closed and destroyed at one point by
the erection of a quarry, the legal duty existed to exclude
public travel by signs and barriers that would plainly warn
travelers of the danger.
There can be no question that the issue as to whether
or not the defendants violated their duty to the Edmunds
family on that November Sunday, 1955, was a question for
the jury. As in Brower v. Moran Paving Co., supra, and
lvletcalf v. Mellen, supra, it was a jury question whether the
alleged sign at the south end of the project, and defendants'
failure to erect any other sign, warning or barricade of any
kind, adequately discharged defendants' duty to Dr. Edmunds
and his family. Any speculation by the defendants that their
duty to warn these plaintiffs of the peril created by defendants'
construction of the drainage excavation would be burdensome
or unreasonable because of the numerous cuts (which actually
did not exist in November, 1955), and numerous access roads,
required to be constructed by the contract, must be considered
for just what it is: speculation. The duty of the defendants
to provide effective barricades, danger signals and other signs
is clear under the cases as well as under the contract.
Defendants next claim that they were relieved from liability to plaintiffs Edmunds because work on the project was
suspended eight days before the plaintiffs were injured due
to seasonal conditions (Ex. 15). In support of their position
defendants recite from Section 1-4.5 of the Standard Specifications (Ex. 12, p. 21-22; defendants' brief, p. 19) which
provides, in part, "When construction operations are sus-'
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pended * * * for which the contractor is not responsible,
maintenance of the road under traffic including signs and
barricades, etc., shall be performed by and at the expense
of the Commission during the period of suspension * * *
necessary signs and barricades as provided by the contractor
shall be left in place during the time of suspension." (Ex.
12, Standard Specifications). Completely ignoring the plain
language just quoted that, in the event of suspension, the Commission shall only be responsible for "maintenance" of the
project as left by the contractors, defendants nevertheless
allege that the Commission thereafter had the duty to rr provide
and maintain" any necessary safety devices. The defendants
also apparently do not recognize that the Commission's duty
of rrmaintenance" did not apply to the old road where the
plaintiffs were injured, but refers only to the new road which
was the rrroad under traffic." The quoted provision further
emphasizes that it was the defendants' duty to provide signs,
warnings and barricades on the old road as well as the new
road, during the period of suspension.
Finally, defendants urge that the placing traffic on the
new portion of U. S. 91 constituted practical acceptance of
the project not requiring formal acceptance as specified in
the contract. Obviously this doctrine has no application to
the facts of this case, first, because the plaintiffs were not
injured on the completed portion of the project, namely, the
new highway; second, because work on the old section of the
highway where the accident occurred was not completed as
to required drainage cuts, scarifying and obliteration; and,
third, because (as recognized in the annotation cited by defendants, 58 ALR 2d 865 at page 877) the doctrine that
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practical acceptance obviates the need of actual acceptance
may be modified by contract. Sec. 1-7.15 of the Standard Specifications at page 43 (Ex. 12) provides: that although portions
of the work may be tentatively accepted for the use of traffic,
''such acceptance shall not constitute final acceptance of the
work or any part of it or a waiver of any provision of the
wntract; * * * " (emphasis added). See also page 51 of the
Standard Specifications, Sec. 1-8.9, ~~Termination of Contractor's Responsibility" set forth in the Statement of Facts herein.
Inasmuch as it is apparent that defendants failed in their
duty to adequately warn plaintiffs of the dangerous excavation,
defendants cannot successfully contend that Dr. Edmunds'
conduct was the sole proximate cause of the injuries sustained
by plaintiffs. The cases relied upon by defendants demonstrate
clearly that the claim of defendants is untenable under the
facts of the case. Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 85
Utah 79, 38 P.2d 743, is readily distinguished from the instant
case, because the highway contractor there fully discharged
his duty to warn travelers by maintaininga barricade at the
excavation six feet tall and 18 feet wide with two lighted
red lanterns which the driver testified he saw 600 feet away.
At page 746 of 38 P.2d the court quotes 7 McQuillin, Municipal
Corps. 216, as follows:
"The question as to the sufficiency of the guard or
warning is not susceptible of a precise answer. The
test is whether the means employed are reasonably
sufficient for the purpose intended, namely, to protect
travelers; and it may be added that the question of
sufficiency is generally one of fact for the jury, although in particular cases barriers may be held sufficient
or insufficient as a matter of law."
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The Nielsen case also quotes the general rule stated in Thomas
v. City of Lexington, 168 Miss. 107, 150 So. 816, 817:
"As a general rule, the question as to whether or
not signals or warnings against existing defects in a
street are sufficient is one for the determination of the
jury. Such is the case where the evidence is conflicting,
or is such that reasonable minds might arrive at different conclusions; but where the evidence is undisputed
and only the inference of negligence can be drawn
from the proven facts as to the nature or character
of the signals or barriers erected as a warning of a
defective or dangerous condition in a street, the question of negligence in respect to the particular defect
or obstruction or warning signal is one for the court."
The Utah court then concludes that under the facts the trial
court should have withheld the case from the jury and directed
a verdict contrary to the general rule which was not applicable.

O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791, is another
case where the defend~t highway contractor had not failed
to adequately warn users of the highway of the danger, but
had erected a proper barricade at the point of danger. The
facts of the 0' Brien case are not similar to those before the
court now.
Clearly the defendants owed the Edmunds family the
duty to erect some sign, warning or barricade on the old
portion of the highway at or near the drainage excavation,
and their failure so to do was the proximate cause of plaintiffs'
injuries.

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. PLAINTIFF P. K. EDMUNDS WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The jury having found the issues in favor of plaintiffs,
the latter are entitled to have all of the evidence, and every
inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom construed
in the light most favorable to them. This is particularly true
as to the question of contributory negligence. See Toomer's
Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P. 2d
163. Dr. Edmunds described the accident as follows:

" * * * We were traveling along the old highway,
which was gray, a light color in contrast to the new
highway, which was black, and about every quarter
mile there was a strip of black coating across the grayold highway to the new highway. * * * And at every
quarter mile that was visible to us. And, I think, it
must have been accentuated by the fact it had been
wet, because it had been recently raining. * * *
"But the blacktop, as most people have observed,
looks blacker when it's wet; and, as I recall, these
strips that had crossed the old-gray highway, old 91,
were quite dark, and then, oh approximately, oh threeeights of a mile, I would estimate, more or less, beyond
the southern extent of our property one of these apparent road strips across the old highway turned out
to be a cut in the road. But it was marvelously deceptive. It looked just exactly like these strips across the
highway. And we were on top of it before I could
discern the difference and see that it was a cut in the
road and too late to keep from crashing into it." (Tr.
98-99).
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Mrs. Edmunds testified similarly as to the deceptive
appeatance of the excavation (Tr. 176, 186-188). The investigating officer stated that the Edmunds car made two heavy
skid marks for approximately 50 feet (Tr. 27). Photographs
of the old roadway (Ex. 2-5) are especially helpful in visualizing this situation inasmuch as they were taken at a height
equivalent to that of the driver of an automobile and were
taken in sequence progressively closer to the cut (Tr. 100).
The jury was permitted to view the accident scene (Tr. 311-12)
and was in possession of all available facts.
Defendants' witness Morrell testified that at the time of
the trial (about 4V2 years after the accident) the cut into which
Dr. Edmunds' car plunged was 27 feet across and 4V2 feet
deep (Tr. 262). Dr. Edmunds estimated the cut was "approximately ten to twelve feet across" and from "two and a half
to maybe three feet" deep (Tr. 101). No doubt the plunging
of Dr. Edmunds' car into the cut and the hauling of it out
could have broken down the edges and widened the cut.
In this connection the testimony of Sgt. Reed is ·interesting.
At page 33 of the Transcript Sgt. Reed, in testifying as to
Exhibit No. 5, the .photograph of the cut into which the car
plunged, taken 6 weeks after the accident, said:
"Well, these look like equipment ruts and tractor
ruts (indicating) that were not there at that time. This
oil was traveled, polished, and this debris and so on
that is shown here was not there at that time."
Previously in his testimony, at page 32 of the Transcript, he
had stated with reference to the 4 photographs of the old
road:
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"They are a fair representation of the area, but the
oil on it had been torn up considerably; in worse shape
that it was on the old road."
The testimony of Sgt. Reed could be the explanation for
the differences in estimates as to the width of the cut and
its depth. It would not take many trips by heavy equipment,
such as tractors, over the edges of the cut to considerably widen
the gap. His testimony clearly indicates, also, that after the
accident, and within a period of 6 weeks, there was sufficient
travel of vehicles of some sort along the old road so that
the "oil on it * * * (was) torn up considerably."
All of the cases cited by defendants are to be distinguished
on their facts. Some involve pedestrians who had time to
prevent their injuries as in Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347,
57 P. 2d 708; Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 495
(crossing busy street without looking) -trial court directed
verdict; Scofield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2d 218, 265
P 2d 396 (fall down stairs); Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522,
229 P 2d 8 74 (fall into service station grease pit) . The
others involve collisions between two motor vehicles-Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P 2d 788 (directed
verdict for defendant affirmed); Spackman v. Carson, 117
Utah 390, 216 P 2d 640, (jury determined no contributory
negligence, affirmed) ; and Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276,
193 P 2d 43 7 (intersection collision). None of the authorities
cited by defendants has direct application.
The automobile headlight cases involving the duty of the
driver to stop his car within "the assured clear distance,"
although not directly in point, are persuasive in the instant
case. The earlier cases were prone to find the existence of
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contributory negligence as a matter of law. (See Dalley v.
l\1id-Wesetrn Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P 2d 309,
and 3 Utah Law Review 198-9, subdivision entitled "Negligence and Assured Clear Distance.") Later cases, as stated
in Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P 2d 642, have
allowed the jury "to determine, in the light of existing conditions, what a reasonable and prudent person would do under
the circumstances. Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 Utah
2 53, 98 P 2d 363 (an accumulation of smoke and mist in
addition to sudden glare from the lights of an approaching
automobile; Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P 2d 117
(sudden blinking lights); Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages,
105 Utah 457, 142 P 2d 674 (fog); Hodges v. Waite, 2 Utah
2d 152, 270 P 2d 461 (curve in road obscuring the obstruction)."
Without pausing, the opinion in the Fretz case continues:
"Appellant reads these later cases as indicating that
the only conditions which may be considered by the
jury are those which occur so suddenly and without
warning that the motorist has no opportunity to stop
his vericle. However, as respondent points out, neither
the fog in the Trimble case nor the curve in the Hodges
case were unforeseeable, and in those cases the motorist was not required to stop but merely to exercise
more than the ordinary amount of care.

" * * * The jury determined that her (plaintiff's)
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances and
we feel that the law lays no heavier duty l!POn her."
The evidence in this case is that Dr. Edmunds had no
warning of any kind, and that existence of the excavation was
not foreseeable. Certainly under all of the existing conditions
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the issue of contributory negligence was properly submitted
to the jury and should not be disturbed on appeal.

POINT III.
THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED BELOW WERE NOT
EXCESSIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY.
That the minor plaintiffs were substantially damaged is
attested by the testimony of their mother and guardian ad
litem, who described their cuts, bruises and fright (Tr. 182-3,
189, 192-3). Dr. Edmunds testified that he treated his children
as their physician and described their contusions, abrasions
and wounds (Tr. 126-7). The item of fright alone, without
other injury, would more than justify the nominal verdicts
of $500.
Plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds received substantial injuries
to her head, lower back, left ankle (Tr. 177, 179-181) requiring X-rays (Tr. 126, 179). Mrs. Edmunds testified:

" * * * in falling I must have hit the back of my head
and broke the windshield, and I must have turned,
because I twisted my ankle and also hit the hump (in
the floor of the car), I imagine, and hurt my back, the
lower spine." (Tr. 177).
Mrs. Edmunds, a registered nurse (Tr. 179), testified that
the bump on her head created a lump about the size of a big
"double yolked egg" (Tr. 177). Dr. Edmunds stated that a
blow on the head like his wife received always results in a
concussion of the brain (Tr. 126).
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Defendants also complain the trial court committed error
in giving instructions that refer to the scene of the accident
as a "roadway." That this term could not be too objectionable
is indicated by the defendants' use of it themselves in their
requested instructions No. 20, 21 and 22. This argument of
defendants is based upon the disputed existence of 20 cuts,
the fencing, and the obliteration which have been thoroughly
discussed and disposed of earlier in this brief. There was no
error in the trial court's instructions occasioned by use of
the term "roadway." Nor was there any error in Instruction
No. 12, which stated that defendants had the duty to use
reasonable care to exclude public travel through adequate signs
and barricades, etc. Instruction No. 5 defines "ordinary care,"
and Instruction No. 4 refers to "ordinary and reasonable care"
and there was no error committed in the instructions given by
the court.
Finally, plaintiffs submit that no error was committed
by the trial court not giving instructions requested by defendants. The substance of defendants' requested Instruction
No. 7 concerning the duty of Mrs. Edmunds to keep a lookout
was adequately covered in the court's Instruction No. 14. The
other requested instructions of defendants were either not
proper or were otherwise adequately covered in the court's
Instructions. The merits of the contents of requested instructions Nos. 15, 19, 20 and 21 have been adequately covered
under Point I of this brief.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs and respondents submit that, under the facts
of this case and the authorities above cited, the judgments of
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the trial court entered on the jury's verdicts were properly
entered, and should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WAYNE C. DURHAM
CLINTON D. VERNON
431 American Oil Building
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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